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Universality in the Making -
On Edmund Husserl's Conception of the One World 
Rodolphe GASCHE 
The idea of philosophy as a rational science that emerges in Greece, and 
which, according to Husserl, coincides with the idea of Europe, is that of a truly 
universal science - a science concerned with what is universal · and carried out in 
a universally reconstructable way. In the wake of the rediscovery of the Greek 
heritage at the beginning of the modern age, this idea found a powerful expression 
in "natural-scientific world-universality" (246) which, basing itself on the spatio-
temporal shapes of bodily things, made the objective world universally 
transparent.1 Yet, as Husserl points out, such objectifying accomplishment is also 
"limited to the mere spatiotemporal shapes or to the structure of space-time 
belonging universally to the world." He adds: "lt can be seen that such an 
accomplishment was. possible only through the essence of this structure and that, 
accordingly, exact objectification could have significance for the world, at least at 
first, only as a world of bodies, whereby everything about the things that was 
itself non-corporeal was abstracted" (349)~ The question then is, how truly universal 
is a science whose "natural-scientific world-universality" does not apply to the 
realm of the souls? As Husserl argues in the Crisis, the repeated attempts to 
establish a scientific psychology modeled after the natural sciences have not only 
failed, the project itself is an absurdity. Even though "there is an immense 
difference between theessence of psychic subjectivity and the essence of a thing" 
(327), it is, indeed, the attempt to objectify, that is, to treat what is of the order of 
subjectivity - acts of consciousness and phenomena - like corporeal things. 
According to Husserl, all "analogizing ... does violence [to this difference]" (327). 
Even the indirect mathematization applicable to objective qualities is bound to fail 
in the case of the· psychic life. Husserl concludes that for a "world as the world 
which also contains spiritual beings ... the idea of an ontology of the world, the 
idea of an objective, universal science of the world, having behind it a universal a 
priori according to which every possible factual world is knowable more geometrico 
- this idea which led even Leibniz astray - is nonsense. For the realm of souls 
there is in principle no such ontology, no science corresponding to the physicalistic-
mathematical ideal" (265). Y et the impossibility of the sciences to objectify the 
1 All page references in the text are to Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Trans-
cendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. 
92 Rodolphe GASCHE 
realm of the souls, and thus to account for what is universal about it, not only 
demonstrates that the universal project of the sciences misses out on one essential 
aspect of the 'World, but, primarily, that it is not universal to begin with. Husserl 
writes: "Philosophy as universal objective science - and this is what all philosophy 
of the ancient tradition was - together with all the objective sciences is not 
universal science at all. lt brings into its sphere of inquiry only the constituted 
object-poles and remains blind to the full concrete being and life that constitutes 
them transcendentally" (176). Now, for Husserl, who claims that "psychic being is 
investigatable in transcendental universality; in a fully systematic way, and in 
principle in essential generality in the form of an a priori science" (265), in a way, 
in other words, that meets the demand of universality, the issue is not simply one 
of compensating for what the natural sciences cannot achieve by developing a 
rigorous science that would do justice to what is specific to the realm of souls. lt 
is not merely a question of juxtaposing subjective universality to the natural-
scientific world-universality. Indeed, what is stake in the phenomenological turn to 
the subjective is the renewal of the task and the promise constitutive of the Greek 
idea of an all-embracing rational science - a truly universal science, one, 
incidentally, in which universal objectivity would be reinscribed, and hence 
transformed. The realm of the subjective, Husserl holds, is one "which is 
completely closed off within itself, existing in its own way, functioning in all 
experiencing, all thinking, all life, thus everywhere inseparably involved" (112). Yet, 
notwithstanding its existence in its own right, and subtending all other domains, 
including that of the objective sciences and the philosophies building upon them, 
the realm of the subjective is thematic neither in everyday · life, nor in the 
sciences. But if philosophy is to · be an all-encompassing science, how can it "fulfill 
the sense of its primal establishment as a universal and ultiniately grounding 
science if it leaves this realm to its 'anonymity'" (112)? Not only that, as Husserl 
will argue, the "anonymous subjectivity" (113) is the "one single ground" (113) on 
which all the objective sciences, the historical philosophies, and everyday thinking 
rest. lt follows from this that only by taking this"constant substratum"(ll3) into 
account, can philosophy become the ·universal science that it promised to seek in 
its primal establishment. 
Given that the universality of the natural sciences was predicated on the 
spatio-temporal shapes of corporeal things, it follows necessarily that the more 
encompassing universality sought through a turn to the sphere of the subjective 
can no longer be of the order of identifiable and identically iterable idealized 
shapes. Even though the mathematical and geometrical idealities are clearly 
universal in that they are free with respect to empirical subjectivity, they are only 
relative, or bound idealities, compared to those of the transcendental subjectivity 
that transcendental phenomenology explores in both of its approaches to the latter, 
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whether inquiring back from the pregiven life-world, or from psychology.2 The free 
idealities characteristic of transcendental subjectivity must necessarily be distinct in 
nature from those predicated on spatial and temporal shapes. Furthermore, 
philosophy as rigorous science, or transcendental phenomenology, rather than 
rendering the domain of the subjective accessible through indirect symbolic and 
mathematical methods, moves "in spheres of direct intuition" of the things 
themselves.3 These things are, as we will see, the "essential forms" (Wesensformen) 
of both individual and collective consciousness. Whether inquiring back from the 
life-world, or from psychology, transcendental phenomenology seeks to exhibit the 
genuinely free universal idealities in the realm of the subjective as the "essential 
forms" that universally shape the subjective and its world-constituting 
accomplishments, thus establishing phenomenology as the true realization of the 
Greek idea of a universal science. For the present purpose it will not be necessary 
to elaborate these forms in full detail, (or, what Husserl, elsewhere, terms the 
noetic-noematic structures of the sense-constituting accomplishments of subjectivity). 
lt must suffice to establish the soundness of such a concept of subjective form, 
and, furthermore, to show that, effectively, a universal science of the essential 
forms of consciousness is possible in a fully systematic way - in principle, in 
essential generality in the form of an a priori science. lt is for this reason, 
therefore, that I turn to the discussion of the life-world in Part III, A of The Crisis 
where Husserl sketches out the rudiments of transcendental phenomenology in 
programmatic fashion. 
As is well known; Husserl's concern with the life-world in his last, and 
unfinished work, has drawn special attention from his interpreters. Notwithstanding 
the fact that he had already made sporadic use of the term (especially in his 
writings from the twenties concerned with attempts to overcome the Cartesian 
dualism of body and soul), they have declared it to be something of a turn in his 
work.4 lt is certainly true that the life-world becomes an explicit theme only in 
The Crisis. However, its analysis is not conducted there for the sake of the life-
world itself; its analysis is only staged to provide one, however new, way into 
transcendental phenomenology. As Paul Ricoeur has noted, "the return to the life-
2 Busserl distinguishes between free and bound idealities in ExJ>erience and fudgment, trans. J. S. Chur-
chill and K. Ameriks, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, p. 267. See also Francoise Dastur, Hus-
serl. Des mathematiques a l 'histoire, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995, p. 111. 
3 Edmund Busserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, 
trans. Q. Lauer, New York: Barper & Row, 1965, p. 147. 
4 Iso Kern, "Die Lebenswelt als Grundlagenproblem der objektiven Wissenschaften und als universales 
Wahrheits- und Seinsproblem," in Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft. in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls, ed. 
E. Ströker, Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1979, p. 69. 
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world is only a moment, an intermediary degree of a more fundamental 'return': 
the return to science as such, to reason as such, beyond its limitation in objective 
thought."5 
If Husserl opens his investigation of the life-world by claiming that objective 
knowledge rests on "an unquestioned ground of presuppositions" (104), and that 
this ground is that of the self-evidences characteristic of the life-world - such as 
the presupposition that the everyday surrounding world of life exists, that it is a 
world that constantly undergoes change, even though it is also the one and same 
world for all, and that in this world we are objects among objects, etc. - his 
objective is clear: to thematize, and to explain "these manifold validities-in-advance, 
i.e., 'presuppositions'," (111) that permeate both pre-scientific and scientific life.6 
"Taken for granted, prior to all scientific thought and all philosophizing 
questioning," these ontic validities are, as Husserls puts it, "the most obvious of the 
obvious" (110). But precisely because they are the "constant presuppositions of 
scientific and, at the highest level philosophical thinking" (110), it becomes 
incumbent upon on philosophy - in particular in the wake of the crisis of the 
European sciences - to radically and systematically investigate the obvious that 
the sciences have never deigned worthy of exploring. The single most prominent 
presupposition of prescientific, as well as scientific thought, is "that the world is -
always in advance - and that every correction of an opinion, whether an 
experiential or other opinion, presupposes the already existing world, namely, as a 
horizon of what in the given case is indubitably valid as existing" (110). lt is above 
all this one presupposition that motivates Husserl's interest in the life-world. If the 
aim of the sciences is to transform prescientific knowledge in and of the world 
into exact knowledge of the world, as a world "which in itself is fixed and 
determined," and which is to be achieved through an infinite process, the origin of 
the presupposition in question requires elucidation.7 
As 1 have said already, the life-world is not as such the theme of Husserl's 
5 Paul Ricoeur, A l 'ecole de la phenomenologie, Paris: Vrin, 1993, p. 292. Not unlike the analytic of Da-
sein which Heidegger in Being and Time develops only as far as is required by the leading question of 
the inquiry - the question of Being - Husserl does not aim at unfolding a full fledged exposition of the 
life-world. As is quite clear from Chapter 51, no "ontology of the life-world" is intended. 
6 Husserl writes that all scientific judgments "are judgments based on the ground of the life-world, that 
is to say, on the ground of a universal validity concerning what is. This universal validity is produced 
through a life of validity of subjects (which is constantly in motion), together with the certitude that 
comes with it, and which validates through all experiences and validation of experience." (Husserl, Die 
Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husserliana, Vol. VI, 
Haag: Nijhoff, 1962, p. 465). 
7 Let me also point out that the life-world remains "constantly in the validity of being." lt is "the per-
manent foundation of knowledge ( Gewusstheitsgrund)." and is known as such. lt is, therefore, "as far as 
its being is concerned not the object of an epoche." (Husserl, Die Krisis, pp. 398-340). 
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late work, but only a new way into transcendental phenomenology. What is more, 
the life-world is not something simply given (there for everyone to see and 
experience), and which could be investigated without further ado. As we will see, 
the life-world as the hidden ground of both prescientific and scientific life and 
thought, requires a disclosure in order for it to come into view in the first place.8 
Indeed, without the suspension, or epoche, of the objective sciences, the life-world 
cannot become thematic at all.9 Furthermore, the phenomenological investigation of 
the life-word in light of the latter's ground-function for all prescientific and 
scientific life, in which the sense-constructs (Sinngebilde) and the subjective 
achievements peculiar to the life-world become manifest, requires an additional 
epoche, a transcendental epoche of the natural attitude characteristic of both 
prescientific and scientific life. Keeping these injunctions in mind, let us nonetheless 
attempt to describe in broad strokes what the life-world amounts to. As Husserl 
writes, the life-world is "the only real world, the one that is actually given through 
perception, that is ever experienced and experiencable - our everyday life-world" 
(49). lt is the world we all have in common - the world common to us all 
(allgemeinsam). Pregiven, in both everyday and scientific life, it is a world whose 
basic structures are fixed at all times, and for all time. Husserl writes: "the life-
world was always there for mankind before science, then, just as it continues its 
manner of being in the epoch of science" (123).10 This world is "the obviously 
existing, ever intuitively pregiven world" (111). The attitude which pervades it is 
8 Elisabeth Ströker, "Geschichte und Lebenswelt als Sinnesfundament der Wissenschaften in Husserls 
Spätwerk," in Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls, ed. E. Ströker, 
Franskfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1979, p. 117. 
9 In the appendices to The Crisis devoted to Descartes, Husserl clearly demarcates his conception of 
epoche from Descartes' universal doubt, and remarks that the epoche "is not universal doubt, which no 
one is capable or powerful enough to enact in any serious way." • A truly universal doubt concerning 
the world is out of question," Husserl remarks. Compared to Descartes' method of doubt, the method of 
the epoche is "a purified Cartesian method" (Husserl, Die Krisis, pp. 407, 408, 409). Rather than deciding 
on being or non being, "the uncomparable significance" of the epoche consists in a disregard (Absehen), 
or abstention (Enthaltung), "from the total validity of the world with all the values that this includes, 
whether experiential or cognitive; from all interests, and all acts that relate to something in the world, 
or are to be related to the world, and that therefore belong themselves as such to the world." In other 
words, taking no account of, or holding off, the naive and straightforward positioning of the world, the 
epoche permits shifting one's attention to the acts of consciousness by which the world is constituted, 
and to discover something that is not of the order of the world itself, namely, "the pure ego." (Die Kri-
sis, p. 410, 469, 410). 
10 Yet, as Husserl also remarks, the theories that the sciences produce through a "continued building-up 
of activities," acquire "the character of validities for the life-world, adding themselves as such to its own 
composition and belonging to it even before that as a horizon of possible accomplishments for develop-
ing science" (131). On how science becomes incorporated into the life-world, see Ströker, "Geschichte 
und Lebenswelt als Sinnesfundament der Wissenschaften in Husserls Spätwerk," in: Lebenswelt und Wis-
senschaft in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls, ed. E. Ströker, Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1979, p. 121. 
As this interacting between the concrete life-world as"the grounding soil" (131) of the sciences and the 
sciences themselves suggest, the concept "life-world" is multifaceted. 
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the natural attitude, namely, the unquestioned assumption that things exist, and 
that in their perception things present themselves as being there in person. 
Husserl readily admits that inquiring into the life-world as the unthematized 
presupposition of the idea of objectivity that dominates the universitas of the 
positive sciences, is to take on "the most obvious of the obvious" (110). But 
according the Crisis, the investigation of what is taken for granted by both 
prescientific and scientific life, opens up "a realm, indeed an infinite realm, of 
always ready and available but never questioned ontic validities," namely, "that the 
world is - always is in advance - and that every correction of an opinion, 
whether an experiential or other opinion, presupposes the already existing world" 
(110). Theoretical praxis, Husserl observes, "is the art of theories, of discovering 
and securing truths with a certain new ideal sense which is foreign to prescientific 
life, the sense of a certain 'final validity,' 'universal validity'" (111). As is obvious 
from Part II of the Crisis, the universal objective a priori of the natural sciences is 
a truth that, initially at least, was experienced as odd and detached from everyday 
life and its opinions. As Husserl repeatedly remarks, the new science that inquires 
into the "validities-in-advance" characteristic of the life-world is not only a very 
strange science because of the new type of questioning that it addresses to the 
sciences, but also because it belongs to "a new and immediately highly enigmatic 
dimension" (111). As we will see, the strangeness of this new science and the 
truths that it exhibits is distinct in nature from the one characteristic of the exact 
sciences. Precisely because this new science's truths concern the subjective 
dimension, the strangeness of these truths must differ from those that relate to 
bodily things, and which alienate the life of the soul. Given that the new science of 
the life-world (or, rather, the science that takes its starting point in the life-world) 
seeks to renew the Greek conception of a universal and all-embracing science, it is 
to be expected that its oddity is closer to the constitutive foreigness of the 
universal in general peculiar to the emerging philosophy in Greece. 
However, as I have indicated, the life-world as the soil of both prescientific 
and scientific life is not readily accessible. In order to bring it explicitly into view 
as an object of investigation in its own right, or in Husserlian parlance, to make it 
thematic, the new science field has to be secured through a method of access that 
"is articulated into a multiplicity of steps, each of which has, in a new way, the 
character of an epoche, a withholding of natural, naive validities and in general of 
validities already in effect" (135). The first epoche suspends all the objective 
sciences, more precisely, the objective theoretical interests, aims, and activities of 
that kind of knowledge. Indeed, how could the life-world as constituted by the 
unquestioned presuppositions and naivetes on which the knowledge in prescientific 
life and in the objective sciences rests, be rendered accessible without such an 
epoche? Only by suspending the objective sciences is it possible to face these 
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presuppositions to begin with, and to reflect upon them in a thinking mode. 
Obviously, the fact that the world exists is not something that one could cease 
assuming, yet in suspending the natural attitude with its belief in the existence of 
the world, this assumption reveals itself as a subjective presupposition. Without 
putting the naturalizing perspective of the objective sciences out of play, this 
subjective dimension peculiar to the world (and the things within it), that is, 
precisely its subjective character, remains hidden. But through this bracketing of 
the natural sciences (as a result of which the life-world becomes thematic as a 
realm of subjective presuppositions, in-advance-validities, or preformed meaning 
formations) the life-world is only brought to light in its manifold relativities and 
conflicting subjective truths. Indeed, from the standpoint of the objective sciences 
the life-world qualifies as "the 'merely subjective-relative'," or mere opinion (doxa) 
(125). 
Obviously, not everything is relative in this "merely subjective-relative" 
realm. In order to bring the non-relative nature of this realm into focus, let me 
point out immediately that the characterization of the presuppositions and 
validities-in-advance unearthed by the first epoche as subjective, and as belonging 
to a subjective realm, is anything but a pejorative provision. As Husserl remarks, 
the questions concerning the manifold validities-in-advance taken for granted in 
everyday and scientific life, are "questions, too, [that] concern the obviously 
existing, ever intuitively pregiven world; but they are not questions belonging to 
that professional praxis and techne which is called objective science ... rather, they 
are questions of how the object, the prescientifically and then the scientifically true 
object, stands in relation to all the subjective elements which everywhere have a 
voice in what is taken for granted in advance" (111). If the exploration of the life-
world is called an inquiry into "the enigma of subjectivity" (5) - an inquiry that 
will prove to be rich in unsettling and strange insights precisely because it 
devotes tothe life-world a "universal and theoretical interest" (112) - it is because 
subjectivity is understood here from its active, productive, or, as Husserl 
sometimes says, creative, involvement in these presuppositions and validities, and, 
hence, in the very constitution of the world as a form of meaning. Subjectivity is 
conceived here primarily from its act character - as an accomplishing, 
performative, and even "historical" activity. The "realm of subjective phenomena 
which have remained 'anonymous'" within prescientific and scientific life, thematized 
by the new science is a realm of "purely subjective phenomena throughout [and] 
not merely facts involving psychological processes of sense data; rather, they are 
mental [geistige] processes which, as such exercise with essential necessity the 
function of constituting forms of meaning [Sinnesgestalten]. But they constitute 
them in each case out of mental 'material' which [itself] proves in turn, with 
essential necessity, to be mental form [geistige Gestalt], i.e., to be constituted; just 
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as any newly developed form [of meaning] is destined to become material, namely 
to function in the constitution of [some new] form" (112). The new dimension of 
phenomena - the purely subjective phenomena - of the life-world that emerge 
once one begins to question the meaning- and validity-implications of the 
presuppositions of extra-scientific and intra-scientific life, are subjective phenomena 
insofar as they are the result of mental processes through which they have come 
into existence. Now, the processes at the origin of the forms of meaning, or mental 
forms, are said to engender these forms according to "essential necessity," that is, 
in conformity with universal laws of essence. Therefore it is the establishment of 
the essential laws that govern the realm of the seemingly subjective-relative that 
will yield a subjective a priori, a universal dimension peculiar to this realm. As a 
consequence, another, and "a much greater task" (142) than that of just mapping 
the life-world, and developing a science of how things are experienced in the life-
world, awaits the phenomenologist. lt is also a much greater task because the 
subjective a priori that is sought, cannot be of the order of a truth in-itself, which 
is the prerogative, and ideal of all objective approach. According to Husserl, even 
to conceive of it "in analogy with the truth-in-itself of nature, is nonsense."11 The 
great task in question is that "of a pure theory of the essence (reinen Wesenslehre) 
of the life-world" (141). 
At this juncture, a further clarification of Husserl's understanding of the life-
world becomes necessary. On numerous occasions, Husserl defines the life-world as 
the world of objects that in everyday life surround us. For example, the life-world 
is said to be "the spatio-temporal world of things as we experience them in our 
pre- and extra-scientific life and as we know them to be experiencable beyond 
what is [actually] experienced. We have a world-horizon as a horizon of possible 
thing-experience. Things: that is, stones, animals, plants, even human beings and 
human products; but everything here is subjective and relative ... " (138). All inquiry 
into what is "formal and general, what remains invariant in the life-world 
throughout all alterations of the relative," that is, into the life-world a priori, takes 
its starting point from "what alone determines for us in life the sense of talking 
about the world," namely, that it is "the universe of things, which are distributed 
within the world-form of space and time and are 'positional' in two senses 
(according to spatial position and temporal position) - the spatio-temporal onta" 
(142). What is at stake in the task faced by the new science about the life-world a 
priori, becomes tangible at this point. The formal and general structures that this 
11 Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. 
Ergänzungsband: Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934-1937, Husserliana, Vol. 29, Doordrecht: Kluwer, 1993, p. 
183. 
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science investigates concerns nothing less than world itself (that is, first, the world 
of spatio-temporal things) as it is subjectively lived, that is, as the world that is 
valid and meaningful in the life-world. lt is an inquiry into the essential subjective 
structures of the world not as an objective whole but as a meaning-construct 
(Sinngehilde), that is, in Husserl's parlance, of the world as a phenomenon. 
Conversely, qua meaning-construct, the world's - the one world's - universal or 
essential structures have their correlate in a "universal accomplishment (Leistung)" 
(113), that is, the equally essential acts of consciousness. Husserl writes: "We shall 
come to understand that the world which constantly exists for us through the 
flowing alterations of manners of givenness is a universal mental acquisition, having 
developed as such and at the same time continuing to develop as the unity of a 
mental configuration, as a meaning-construct [Sinngehilde] - as the constant of a 
universal, ultimately functioning subjectivity" (113). The passage 
through the life-world as a way toward the new science that is to renew the 
Greek project of a universal all-encompassing science serves to show how the 
hitherto anonymous sphere of subjectivity is made up of processes through which 
the universal sense of the one world presupposed by all the spiritual 
accomplishments of mankind is constituted according to essential laws. The one 
world, of which we are aware in the life-world, despite, or precisely because we 
live in particular worlds, is to be shown to be a spiritual, mental universal 
achievement, the product of intentional acts of consciousness - hence, a historical 
accomplishment, one that continues to develop, and whose unity is constantly in 
the making. The one world, the total horizon of the world, as that which is shared 
by all, is thus not something to be taken for granted, or something positively 
given, and that exists once and for all independently of mankind. Rather, its 
universality is something that is secured, and is to be secured, by mankind in an 
infinite process. 
As we have seen, what is invariant and general in the subjective-relative 
realm of the life-world is to be approached first by way of the world of spatio-
temporal objects, because in the life-world, as "a world of sense intuition, [and] a 
sensible world of appearances," "everything that exhibits itself ... as a concrete 
thing obviously has a bodily character, even if it is not a mere body, as for 
example, an animal or a cultural object, i.e., even if it also has psychic or 
otherwise spiritual properties" (106). Notwithstanding the fact that in the life-world 
one is aware of the world only in relation to objects and their content alterations 
and the changes in their perception, as well as through their relations to other 
objects, that is, as the horizon of existing objects, "'the' world, as existing in a 
unified way, persists throughout, being corrected only in its content" (105). But as 
Husserl is quick to observe, the life-world is not only our everyday spatio-temporal 
world of bodily things; it is also the world of "straightforward [schlichten] 
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intersubjective experiences" (133). After having shown that in all sense-perception 
of objects my living-body (Leib) plays a constant role - in the sense that all the 
aspects of bodies appearing in perception are intimately linked to the 
kinesthetically functioning living body - he notes that as "full ego-subjects," we are 
not merely "ego[s] through the living body [die leibliche Ichlichkeit]," each of us is 
as weil a "full-fledged 'I-the-man'" (108). I am an ego not only by virtue of a living 
body, but also insofar as I am an individual human being, one together with others 
in the world. Husserl writes: "Thus in whatever way we may be conscious of the 
world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each 'I-the-
man' and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the 
world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely 
through this 'living together'" (108). As a human subject, the ego is not only a 
living body which is constantly active" on the basis of [its] passive having-of-the-
world [passive Welthabe]" (108) of objects, this world, as the coherent universe of 
existing objects pregiven to the ego, is also the world of the others, the one world 
that the human beings share with one another. The world thus is not merely my 
world, but always already our world, a world that is a function of living together. 
Now, in the life-world, all our affections by and actions on objects, as well as all 
our dealings with others in the world, take place against the background of this 
passive having-of-the-world. In all one's preoccupations one is aware of the world, 
but one is conscious of it always only "in terms of some object-content or other, in 
the alteration of the different ways of being conscious ... and also in the alteration 
of affection and action ... and such that the affecting objects are now thematic, 
now unthematic" (109). The consciousness of the world in the life-world is thus a 
consciousness in constant motion. This is not only the case for me as an individual 
ego faced with the sensibly intuitable world of bodily things, but also for me as a 
human being in the world with others. Although "we, in living together, have the 
world pregiven in this 'together,' as the world valid as existing for us and to 
which we, together, belong, the world as world for all, pregiven with this ontic 
meaning," this awareness of togetherness, and hence, of the world as our world, 
comes in the life-world always only "with a residuum which remains unthematic -
remains, so to speak, anonymous" (109). To elucidate this unthematic and 
anonymous residuum is the prime objective of phenomenology. 
As we have seen, the epoche of the objective sciences makes the life-world 
explicitly thematic. But this suspension of the objectifying attitude and the 
accompanying awareness of the pregiven world is something that happens already 
in some form in what Husserl terms, "waking life." "Waking life is always a 
directedness toward this or that, being directed toward it as an end or as a 
means, as relevant or irrelevant, toward the interesting or the indifferent, toward 
the private or public, toward what is daily required or intrusively new" (281). In 
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"normal, unbroken, coherent life," one wakingly lives in the life-world, that is, one is 
conscious of the fact that the life-world "is always already there, existing in 
advance for us, the 'ground' of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical" 
(142). One lives in the awareness of the fact that we always "live-in-certainty-of-the-
world." Such waking life amounts to "be[ing] awake to the world, being constantly 
and directly 'conscious' of the world and of one self as living in the world, actually 
experiencing and actually effecting the ontic certainty of the world. The world is 
pregiven thereby, in every case, in such a way that individual things are given" 
(142-3). But, according to Husserl, one must distinguish the consistently reflective 
attitude from this still "naive - and natural straightforward attitude 
(Geradehineinstellung)" in which one consciously experiences things or objects 
"within the world-horizon," that is, as "'something of the world."12 The different 
attitudes of being conscious of the world rest on the "fundamental difference" 
between things within the world, and the world itself, which is not a thing. The 
world-horizon is irreducible to the things that appear within it, and therefore we 
must assume that the ways in which the being of an object within the world and 
the world itself are experienced, "prescribe fundamentally different correlative 
types of consciousness for them" (145). Now, rather than simply taking a conscious 
stand in the pregiven life-world, the reflective attitude makes the life-world 
thematic by reflecting on how it and the objects within it are given. Such inquiry 
into "the 'how' of the subjective manner of givenness of life-world and life-world-
objects" (143), no longer takes the givenness of the life-world that the first epoche 
explicitly brought to light, for granted, and straightforwardly takes a stand within 
it, but inquires into the pregiving of the world. lndeed, to be given, Husserl 
explains, means, "to be valid in a conscious fashion (bewusstseinsmässig geltend), and 
to be for us certain in its being with this or that content."13 Whereas in normal, 
straightforwardly waking life, one lives toward the world-horizon (in den 
Welthorizont Hineinleben) - an attitude in which "all our interests have their goal 
in objects" (144) and in which we "live in 'infatuation' (lebt „. verschossen auf die 
Einheitspole hin)" (176) with the things in the world - there is, Husserl ascertains, 
"a completely different [ganz andere] sort of waking life involved in the 
consciousness of having of the world" (144). lt "consists in a transformation of the 
thematic consciousness of the world which breaks through [durchbrechende 
Wandlung] the normality of straightforward living" (144). This wholly other kind of 
12 The reflective attitude is made possible by waking life in the life-world, but it is also one that im-
plies a complete reorientation of interest - one which makes the world-horizon thematic as such. 
13 Husserl, Die Krisis . .. Ergänzungsband, p. 93. 
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thematization of the world, which violently shatters and transforms ordinary 
consciousness of the pregivenness of the world, arises with the realization that 
rather than simply having objects "as the substrates of their properties ... we 
become conscious of them (and of everything ontically meant) through subjective 
manners of appearance, or manners of givenness" (144). The violence and oddity of 
this completely different kind of waking life regarding the world rests with the 
subjective dimension of the world that takes us away from the infatuation with the 
objects themselves. With the awareness of the subjective modes in which objects 
- and hence the world - are pregiven to us, a "new universal direction of 
interest" emerges, an "interest exclusively and consistently directed toward how -
the world - comes into being for us; how, that is, there arises in us the constant 
consciousness of the existence, of the universal horizon, of real, actually existing 
objects, each of which we. are conscious of only through the alterations of our 
relative conceptions of it, of its manners of appearing, its mode of validity, even 
when we are conscious of it in particularity as something simply being there" (144-
145). The "new universal interest" in the manifold ways in which the world and 
its objects appears to us in the life-world thus opens up the possibility of 
establishing how, subjectively speaking, the world, "the coherent, universal validity 
world," comes into being for us. In the subsequent analyses into the correlation of 
consciousness and world, ."a great horizon of remarkable [merkwürdige] truths" 
comes into light, Husserl ascertains, which never before had been investigated, and 
which do not fail to "evoke philosophical wonder" (165). As we have seen, the 
reflective attitude which opens up this new interest arises in waking life from the 
life-world itself. The very oddity of these truths is not only owed to the 
recognition of a correlation between world and world-consciousness, but results 
from the fact that this correlation reveals itself to have "an essential necessity," 
and that it allows for translation "into essential generalities, into ail. immense 
system of novel and highly astounding a priori truths" (166). The strangeness of 
the truths in question only glimpsed in waking life in the life-world - a 
strangeness which evokes philosophical wonder, in other words, which causes 
philosophy to violently make a breakthrough in everyday life - stems from the 
recognition of the universality of the subjective a priori. The very universality of 
the subjective structures exhibited in the analyses of how things and the world 
appear to us, shatters straightforward living toward things within the world in 
everyday waking life, and opens up the task of the philosophical. 
However, in spite of the fact that this new direction of interest is borne in 
the life-world itself, to be carried out genuinely, it requires securing the new realµi 
of inquiry, and the development of a method of investigation cut to the size of this 
new field. Although the first epoche of objectifying knowledge has made the 
pregiven life-world manifest as one of manifold relativities, the investigation of the 
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correlation of world and world-consciousness in light of the subjective universal a 
priori, requires that the pregivenness of the life-world become manifest as such. A 
second epoche, in Husserl's parlance, a transcendental epoche, that is, a freeing of 
the inquiring gaze from the natural attitude, and its general thesis of the existence 
of the world, thus becomes necessary in order for the pregiving structures of 
subjectivity to surface. Needless to say, that the world is pregiven is not 
something one could cease assuming, but by suspending the belief in the existence 
of the world, one can come to see how we produce this (necessary) assumption, 
how subjectivity is involved in its assumed existence. Through the transcendental 
epoche, the world-constituting subjectivity, the transcendental primordiality of 
constituting life anterior to all constituted formations, becomes thematic as such. 
Finally, this second epoche also makes possible the "transcendental reduction," 
which itself opens up the dimension of the transcendental correlation between 
world and world-consciousness. 
For our purposes, a very summary description of the findings of the 
correlation analyses must suffice. Once one begins to inquire into the modes in 
which objects are subjectively given within the life-world, that is, "into how an 
object ... exhibits itself as being and being-such, we enter a realm of more and 
more involved and very remarkable exposition (sich immer mehr verwickelnder und 
sehr merkwürdiger Aufweisungen) .... [I]n reflection we recognize with astonishment 
(Staunen) that essential correlations obtain here which are the component parts of 
a farther-reaching, universal a priori" (159). The first discovery made in scrutinizin~ 
the how of the appearance of things is that of "a fixed typology ... [that] applies 
not only to perceiving, to bodies, and to the penetrable depths of immediate 
sensibility but to any and every entity within the spatio-temporal world, and to its 
subjective manners of givenness" (166). While having, at first, the looks of a 
"confusingly manifold typology of correlations, comprising further differentiations at 
every turn," this typology proves itself to be a "total multiplicity," that is, a 
multiplicity that possesses ideality and essential generality (166). Husserl observes 
that in centering on the subjective acts in which world and things appear to us, 
"a number of never thematically investigated types, not only of individual things 
but also of syntheses, in an inseparable synthetic totality which is constantly 
produced by intentionally overlapping horizon-validities" come into view (145). This 
"synthetic totality,'' or "universe of synthetically connected accomplishments" (145) 
of consciousness, is the totality of the world-constituting acts of subjectivity, or, as 
Husserl also calls it, the "world-nucleus (Weltkern)" (133), i.e., the subjective 
correlate of the world as the world that has ontic meaning and ontic validity for 
us. The subjective universe of "universal accomplishing life in which the world 
comes to be as existing for us constantly in flowing particularity, constantly 
'pregiven' to us" (145), thus reveals itself as the constitutive correlate of the world 
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and its own universal structures. That which in the natural attitude characteristic 
of both the prescientific life in the life-world and scientific life was taken for 
granted - the spatio-temporal existence of things in the world, their universal 
causal style, etc. - all this now appears to be a function of subjective 
accomplishments, whose universal structures are therefore more fundamental. 
An additional implication of the discovery of the synthetic totality of the 
subjective accomplishments regarding things in the world needs mentioning here. 
As we have seen, the analyses of the correlation between things and the 
subjective modes of their givenness, yield a multiplicity of acts that form a 
synthetic totality. As far as an individual entity is concerned, this is "an ideal set 
of actual and possible experiential manners of givenness, each of which is an 
appearance of this one entity." Consequently, any actual concrete experience of an 
object is merely a realization of one of the manners of givenness that make up the 
total multiplicity of the intentional acts in question. According to Husserl, the latter 
represents "a horizon of possible realizable processes, as opposed to the actual 
process, and as such it belongs to each experience, or rather to the intention 
which is operative within it" (167). The horizon of the possible ways in which 
things can be given - a horizon that is necessarily implied in any actual concrete 
way in which an entity is given - thus relativizes the originality of any singular 
experience of a thing, and links it to the ideal and synthetic multiplicity of the 
manners of givenness that form the total horizon within which that experience 
occurs. Differently worded, the life-world a priori shows that any singular 
experience occurs against the background of a universal world-horizon implicit 
within any such experience. Husserl leaves no doubt regarding the "fact" that "no 
conceivable human being, no matter how different we imagine him to be, could 
ever experience a world in manners of givenness which differ from the incessantly 
mobile relativity" of the world pregiven to him, and the "great horizon of 
remarkable truths" about this pregiven world that the correlation analyses have 
brought to light (165). 
From these analyses of the modes in which things are perceived in the life-
world, and from which it becomes clear that "anything that is - what ever its 
meaning and to whatever region it belongs - is an index of a subjective system 
of correlations" (165), it follows that the total intentional accomplishment of 
subjectivity involved in the constitution of the world as a formation of meaning, 
cannot be that of the "isolated subject." Husserl advances that "we are dealing, 
rather, with the entirety of the accomplishment of communalized intersubjectivity" 
(167; translation modified). As we have already shown, the life-world is not only 
that of everyday surrounding spatio-temporal things, within the life-world we are 
also with others. Apart from the phenomena which affect the ways in which 
things are subjectively perceived in the individual ego's perception of things -
Universality in the Making - On Edmund Husserl's Conception of the One World 105 
kinesthetics, alteration of validity, horizon-consciousness, and so forth - there is 
also"the fact that in our continuously flowing world-perceiving we are not isolated 
but rather have, within it, contact with other human beings" (163). Since in "living 
with one another each one [has not only his or her perceptions, presentifications, 
devaluations of his or her certainties, etc„ but] can take part in 
the life of others"; straightforward, or individual perception is, from the outset, 
. communalized from within. In a way analogous to what happens in individual 
perception and experiences where the individual series of experiences within my 
own experiential life enter into contact, and mutually correct each other, my 
experiential acquisitions also enter into contact with those of others, with the effect 
that, "for the most part, intersubjective harmony of validity occurs, [establishing 
what is] 'normal' in respect to particular details, and thus an intersubjective unity 
also comes about in the multiplicity of validities and of what is valid through 
them" (163). By way of this reciprocal correction, or, as Husserl also describes it, 
"critique" (163), of individual validity claims, the world as one and the same world 
is engendered in a communalized subjectivity which "continuously maintains 
constant validity as the world which is in part already experienced and in part 
the open horizon of possible experiences for all; it is the world as the universal 
horizon, common to all man, of actually existing things" (164).14 Even though each 
one has his or her experienced things, "each individual 'knows' himself [then] to be 
living within the horizon of his fellow human beings „„ He knows that he and his 
fellows, in their actual contact, are related to the same experienced things in such 
a way that each individual has different aspects, different sides, perspectives, etc., 
of them but that in each case these are taken from the same total system of 
multiplicities of which each individual is constantly conscious (in the actual 
experience of the same thing) as the horizon of possible experience of this thing" 
(164). 
The unifying multiplicities exhibited in the investigation of individual object-
perception are themselves relativized by the deeper-lying multiplicities of 
communalized life within which individual object-perception is inscribed. What all of 
this proves is not only that the total synthesis of intentional subjectivity has 
multiple levels, but that this synthetic accomplishment is that of a communalized 
intersubjectivity (vergemeinschafteten Intersubjectivität). As Husserl points out, "all 
the levels and strata through which the syntheses, intentionally overlapping as 
14 Let us also mention that critique is involved in the formation of the ego's identity. Pointing to the 
essential role that temporalization occupies for the ego's identity, Husserl writes, that as "now actually 
present," the ego is temporalized in that it "has contact with its past ego, even though the latter is pre-
cisely no longer present: it can have a dialogue with it and critique it, as it can others" (172). 
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they are from subject to subject, are intervowen, form a universal unity of 
synthesis; through it the objective [gegenständliche] universe comes to be - the 
world which is and as it is concretely and vividly given (and pregiven for all 
possible praxis)" (168). The "obscure horizon" (167) of the formation of the world as 
objective universe is none other than that of the syntheses of communalized 
intersubjectivity. lt is in "intersubjective constitution" that "the world, meaning by 
this the total system of manners of givenness, however hidden, also of modes of 
validity for egos" (168), comes into being. The world thus formed through 
intersubjective constitution is the world as a "structure of meaning (Sinngehilde)." 
Husserl writes: "Through this constitution, if we systematically uncover it, the 
world as it is for us becomes understandable as the structure of meaning formed 
out of elementary intentionalities" (168). The one world shared by all, is a product 
of elementary subjective accomplishments, not something objectively given, but 
something whose unity is constantly generated through critical acts of correction 
by which individual validity claims become relativized. In uncovering and opening 
up the "obscure horizon" of its constitution "through methodical regressive inquiry" 
(167), the world as a structure of meaning reveals itself as the correlate of the 
world-constituting transcendental ego. For the accomplishment of this task, the 
transcendental epoche is instrumental 
From everything we have seen so far, it should be clear that the 
transcendental ego is not the individual ego, but the ego of communalized 
intersubjectivity. However, as Husserl also notes, by suspending the natural 
attitude with respect to the world in the transcendental epoche, not only the world 
is reduced to a phenomenon, mankind is reduced as well "to the phenomenon 
'mankind.'" While the reduction of world to the transcendental phenomenon 'world' 
permits one to understand it as a meaning-formation, the reduction of mankind to 
the phenomenon 'mankind', "makes it possible to recognize mankind as a self-
objectivation of transcendental subjectivity which is always functioning ultimately 
and is thus 'absolute'" (153). Before discussing the phenomenon 'mankind' any 
further let us remind ourselves that bracketing the natural attitude, the radical, or 
transcendental, epoche reduces everything objective to the unitary multiplicity of its 
subjective modes of givenness, that is, to the status of something intended or 
meant (Gemeintes). However, in this inquiry into the subjective, the objective is 
not transformed into "a psychic occurrence in men through which they gain 
experience of the world, everyday or scientific opinion about the world" (179). Qua 
epoche of everything objective, the subjective in the sense of psychic process has 
been put out of play as well, precisely because the subjective in this sense 
presupposes the givenness of the world. Undoubtedly, in "the pure attitude focused 
upon correlations, created by the epoche, the world, the objective, becomes itself 
something subjective," but since "even the 'subjective' is relativized" (179) by the 
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epoche, subjective refers here to something other than the psychological 
subjectivity of the T. Husserl explains: "The world (called 'transcendental 
phenomenon' in the transformed attitude) is from the start taken only as a 
correlate of subjective appearances, views, subjective acts and capacities through 
which it constantly has, and ever attains anew, its changeable [but] unitary sense" 
(179). These appearances of the world reduced to its phenomenal essence, are 
construed as its subjective manners of givenness. lf, consequently, "the ego-poles 
and everything about them of a specifically ego-character become the subject of 
essential inquiry, they „. become, in a new and still higher sense, the subjective 
aspect of the world and also of its manners of appearing." In contrast to the 
psychological concept of subjectivity which presupposes the over-againstness of the 
objective world, as well as its pregivenness and unquestioned existence 
independent from it, the concept of subjectivity in the epoche "encompass[es] 
everything: ego-poles and the universe of ego-poles, multiplicities of appearance or 
object-poles and the universe of object-poles" (179). As Husserl avers, for the sense 
constituting transcendental ego the assumption of a being exterior to it makes no 
sense.15 lndeed, it is not to be thought as an inside opposed to something outside. 
lt follows already from this unheard of concept of subjectivity that the 
transcendental ego constitutive of the world is not human subjectivity, nor the 
collective subject of mankind insofar as the latter remain part of the world that it 
is supposed to constitute. As a real entity, the 'we' in the sense of "we human 
beings" has become a phenomenon in the epoche, that is, an "object-pole and 
[hence] subject-matter for inquiry back into the correlative intentionalities" of 
which it is the pole, and through whose function the 'we' has attained its ontic 
meaning. Husserl, therefore, can ask: "are the trai:J.scendental subjects, i.e. those 
functioning in the constitution of the world, human beings? After all, the epoche 
has made them into 'phenomena,' so that the philosopher within the epoche has 
neither himself nor others naively and straightforwardly valid as human beings but 
precisely only as 'phenomena,' as poles for transcendental regressive inquiries" 
(183). As a consequence, the transcendental subject is not human if human is to 
refer to "real psychophysical beings" whether individual or collective (183). The 
world-constituting ego is the ego not of mankind as a socio-historical reality, but of 
its phenomenon in the shape of communalized intersubjectivity. The 
transcendentally accomplishing subjectivity highlighted by the radical epoche and 
whose total essential form becomes available through eidetic reduction is an a-
human subjectivity. But what becomes clear at this point as well is that the 
15 Husserl, Die Krisis, p. 415. 
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subject-pole constitutive of the one world, is like the one world itself, not a static 
idea, but an idea in the Kantian sense, ever unfinished, and thus the object of an 
infinite task. This, then, is the new universal truth unearthed by the new science 
that renews the Greek project of a rational and all-encompassing science. lt is, 
indeed, a very odd universality that binds all humans, precisely because it is a-
human, but its a-humanity, that is, its aloofness with respect to all particular 
humanities, is also what secures its universally binding value for human beings. 
Anything human, would be too human, in order to be truly be binding. But the a-
humanity of this new universal truth is not, unlike the objective a priori, an 
alienating form. Husserl argues that "each human being 'bears within himself a 
transcendental 'I' - not as a real part or a stratum of his soul (which would be 
absurd) but rather insofar as he is the self-objectification, as exhibited through 
phenomenological self-reflection, of the corresponding transcendental 'I'" (186). 
Furthermore, as is obvious from the elaborations on the transcendental ego in Part 
III, B of The Crisis , in which Husserl pursues a way into phenomenological 
philosophy from psychology, the transcendental ego, although in one sense radically 
different from the empirical psychological ego, is, in a different sense, still the 
same. lt is, therefore, that the intrinsic alterity of the subjective a priori's 
universality is distinctly different from the alieness of the objective universal. 
Before further elaborating on this new, more all-embracing, universal, it is 
necessary to recall Husserl's contention that his conclusion that the world-
constituting intersubjective ego is nothing human was a bit premature given that 
it is always"I" "who performs the epoche, and even if there are others, and even if 
they practice the epoche in direct community with me, [they and] all other human 
beings with their entire act-life are included, for me, within my epoche, in the 
world-phenomenon which, in my epoche, is exclusively mine" (184). The point 
Husserl wishes to bring home here is that the discovery of transcendental 
subjectivity always rests on what he calls "the primal 'I' (Ur-Ich), the ego of my 
epoche, which can never lose its uniqueness and personal indeclinability" (185). But 
there is no mistaking this primal "I" which performs the radical epoche in "a 
unique sort of philosophical solitude" (184), for one "I," that is, in the sense of an 
"I" that would have cut itself off from all the others, and to which it thus 
continues to belong. As Husserls avers, the ''I" that performs the epoche is 
"actually called 'I' only by equivocation though it is an essential equivocation since, 
when 1 name it in reflection, 1 can say nothing other than: it is 1 who practice the 
epoche, 1 who interrogate, as phenomenon, the world which is now valid for me 
according to its being and being-such, with all its human beings, of whom 1 am so 
fully conscious" (184). Because the "I" who focuses on transcendental 
intersubjectivity is not the "I" of the single, concrete individual, the role that 
Husserl attributes to the "primal 'I'" does not contradict the preceding claim "of a 
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transcendental intersubjectivity constituting the world as 'world for all,' in which I 
again appear, this time as 'one' transcendental 'I' among others, whereby 'we all' 
are taken as functioning transcendentally" (184).16 Yet, this emphasis on the primal 
"I" as one which "starting from itself and in itself ... constitutes transcendental 
intersubjectivity, to which it then adds itself as a merely privileged member, 
namely, as T among the transcendental others (als Ich der transzendentalen 
Andern)" (185), has frequently been denounced as indicative of an essential 
Husserlian solipsism. Taking its starting point in this primal 'I', however 
transcendental, is certainly further evidence of Husserlian phenomenology's 
continuing indebtedness to the metaphysics of subjectivity. Be that as it may, the 
central position attributed to the "I" in the constitution of intersubjectivity is 
paradoxically what endows Husserl's concept of universality with a set of features 
that radically distinguish it from the objective conception of universality, whether 
in the natural sciences or in philosophies modeled after the latter. Indeed, by 
insisting on the fact that transcendental intersubjectivity is constituted, first and 
foremost, by the 'I' who practices the epoche (which then makes itself declinable, 
for itself, transcendentally), Husserl highlights his understanding of universal 
intersubjectivity and its correlate, the world-horizon as products of intentional acts. 
He also shows that rather than being preformed ideas in some topos ouraneos, 
intersubjectivity and world-horizonality are dependent on subjective acts of 
consciousness. Transcendental community is not a given, rather, it is something 
that is being produced, that, therefore, is also historical, in the sense that one has 
never finished bringing it to life by a communalized subject which itself needs 
constant work.17 Both communalized intersubjectivity and the world-for-all are 
tasks precisely insofar as they are sense-formations constituted by an ego. They 
are Ideas in the Kantian sense. Finally, by highlighting the primordiality of the 
"primal 'I'," Husserl may also suggest that in the face of communalized 
intersubjectivity, the singularity of the T who constitutes this very same 
intersubjectivity, is not a given either. lt itself is something that can only be 
achieved in a radical act, that is, in the act in which "I" perform the epoche. 
Husserl's insistence on the "primal T" is thus also an attempt to secure the 
16 See also Husserl, Die Krisis, pp. 416-17. 
17 Husserl's claim that the prima! T of the epoche constitutes intersubjectivity, adding itself to it merely 
as a privileged member,"namely as the 1 of the transcendental Others (als Ich der transzendentalen 
Andern)," that is, as the T which constitutes the transcendental Others, implies that each "I" itself must, 
freely one could say, constitute "in itself an other as other" (185). This constitution of the other, which, 
as various analyses in Crisis suggest, takes place in analogy to the ways in which an actual "I" consti-
tutes "itself in self-temporalization as enduring through 'its' pasts" (185), rather than encroaching on the 
other, throws the recognition of the other onto the seif, and turns it into a task, an infinite task at that 
if the other is to be recognized in its otherness. 
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singularity and uniqueness of an "I" which at the same time appears as one 
transcendental 'I' among others in constituted intersubjectivity, by turning it into 
the objective of an infinite task. Undoubtedly, as Husserl acknowledges, as products 
of an a-human subjectivity, these ldeas appear strange, and contrary to everyday 
opinions. But insofar as these Ideas are products of a consciousness practicing the 
epoche, they are, unlike objective universality, absolutely binding. 
The universals that have made the natural sciences so successful in 
mathematizing nature are as, we have seen, a function of the spatio-temporal shape 
of bodily things. Universality for the sciences, and the philosophies that have taken 
their lead, is predicated on geometric form. According to Husserl, all attempts to 
map the realm of the psyche in a way similar to the explication of nature by the 
sciences must therefore fail. Now, the life-world as the ground to which the 
objective sciences must be traced back is the spatio-temporal world of things 
experienced in pre- and extrascientific life. The science of the life-world - a 
science inquiring into transcendental subjectivity - is one that shows that "natural, 
objective world-life is only a particular mode of the transcendental life which 
forever constitutes the world, [though] in such a way that transcendental 
subjectivity, while living on in this mode, has not become conscious of the 
constituting horizons and never can be aware of them" (175-6). However, once 
transcendental subjectivity reflects on its infatuation with the objects in the world, 
"the full and true ontic meaning of objective being, and thus of all objective truth, 
is set forth" (176). lt thus becomes clear that objective science and its universal 
truths are not truly universal, but are inscribed, as it were, in the universal 
structures exhibited by the inquiry into the life-world. The science of 
transcendental subjectivity is the only science that can claim the title of a 
universal science. What makes it universal are thus not the spatio-temporal forms 
of the bodily things in the world, but the structures of the elementary 
intentionalities that form the structures of meaning, including those of the spatio-
temporal form. Rather than being predicated on shape, the universality of the new 
science of the accomplishing life of transcendental subjectivity is predicated on 
what Husserl calls, "the essential form (Wesensform) of the transcendental 
accomplishments in all their types of individual and intersubjective 
accomplishments, that is, the total essential form (die gesamte Wesensform) of 
transcendentally accomplishing subjectivity in all its social forms" (178). What is 
universal in the endless flow of subjective constituting life are the essential forms, 
or forms of essence, as well as the totality of these forms disclosed through the 
method of eidetic reduction. lf these forms, which are forms in a new sense, in 
that they constitute subjectivity in its innermost elementary acts and 
intentionalities, are universal, it is also because every "I" can practice the radical 
epoche of the natural attitude, perform the eidetic reduction, and reconstruct the 
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procedures by which the universals in question have been laid bare.18 In short, 
they can be established intersubjectively in the strictest way, and made 
apodictically evident. 
At one point, while evoking "the endless array" of problems and discoveries 
made in the wake of the reoriented interest of the epoche, and the subsequent 
recognition of "the purely subjective in its own self-enclosed pure context as 
intentionality," one is led to wonder whether the correlation-analyses will ever hit 
rock bottom. But Husserl remarks that, although, "indeed, every 'ground' that is 
reached points to further grounds, every horizon opened up awakens new horizons, 
and yet the endless whole, in its infinity of flowing movement, is oriented toward 
the unity of one meaning; not, of course, in such a way that we could ever simply 
grasp and understand the whole; rather, as soon as one has fairly well mastered 
the universal form of meaning formation, the breadths and depths of this total 
meaning, in its infinite totality, take on valuative [axiotische] dimensions: there arise 
pro blems of the totality as that of a universal reason" (170). In spite of the 
daunting complexity of the analyses of the world-constituting processes of 
subjectivity, each newly disclosed level of sense-formation reveals itself also to be 
interwoven with deeper lying syntheses, thus suggesting a universal unity of 
synthesis. lf the one, infinite totality of meaning intimated by the universal form of 
meaning-formation, cannot simply be grasped and understood as a whole, is it not 
precisely because rather than simply a hidden ground, this ground is a ground still 
to be constituted in an infinite process, or progress? The infinite totality in 
question here is the horizon with respect to which a particular meaning-formation 
acquires meaning to begin with, but this horizon also temporalizes it, defining it as 
one moment in the infinite task of accomplishing the total meaning. The infinite 
totality presupposed and aimed at by all subjective and intersubjective acts of 
consciousness, takes on valuative dimensions, Husserl holds. Indeed, the one total 
meaning toward which point the universal forms structuring all the acts of 
intentional meaning-formation, particularly to the extent that they are acts of a 
communalized intersubjectivity, has the status of a value, a norm, or principle of 
axiology. With this valuative quality, that is, the idea (in a Kantian sense) of a 
totality of meaning of all acts of consciousness, Husserl, as we have seen, invokes 
the question of a universal reason. 
This question which had been broached in the first part of the Crisis (and 
18 As Derrida has pointed out, Husserl's renewed concept of universal form remains caught within 
metaphysics because this new concept is attained through an analysis of the ego. (See Jacques Derrida, 
"Form and meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language", Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp. 158, 169, 172.) 
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the "Vienna Lecture"), is not further developed in the remaining part of the 
existing body of the work. Y et in the manuscript appended as Chapter 73 by 
Walter Biemel to the unfinished manuscript in the first complete edition of the 
Crisis as Volume VI of the Husserliana, this question is taken up at some length. 
To conclude, I turn to a commentary of some of these pages whose unquestionable 
ponderousness should not distract from their indisputable significance regarding 
that with which we have been concerned, and which the English translation 
features as Appendix IV. The idea of a truth in itself, and its correlate, being 
itself, on which the project of a universal science of the world rests, that is, the 
project of philosophy as it emerges in ancient Greece, may weil be "a philosophical 
invention [Erfindung]," Husserl admits. But he is also quick to note that it is "not 
a dispensable invention without significance, but one which raises - or is called to 
raise - man to a new level in a new historical development of human life [in 
einer neuen Historizität menschheitlichen Lehens], a historical development whose 
entelechy is the new idea and the philosophical or scienti:fic praxis belonging to it, 
the method of a new sort of scientific thinking" (336). Even though as a thinking 
being, "the man of everyday life „. has the katalon,'' i.e., the notion of the general, 
or universal, in everyday life he achieves only relative truths. Yet, the very 
"invention," or discovery, of the idea of a truth in itself - a universal truth -
submits everyday life to the very strange demand of an altogether different kind 
of life and historicity - a life in view of the non-relative, and its universally binding 
truths. Although from the Renaissance on, this new standard for shaping human 
life has taken root in Europe under the form of the objective sciences, the Greek 
idea of a life refashioned in light of universal truths is now conceived of, by way 
of Husserl's elaborations on the intersubjective constitution of the world, in more 
fundamental terms than those of the natural sciences and its type of universally 
binding truth. Explaining that his use of the term "transcendental" to characterize 
phenomenological philosophy as the new science that renews the Greek idea of an 
all-embracing rational science, and, hence, the idea that animates "Europe," pays 
tribute to idealism as the only philosophy that has provided something of a 
bulwark against the objectifying thrust of the natural sciences, Husserl invokes 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and ascertains that "reason is the specific 
characteristic of man," and that, therefore, his life "is a constant becoming through 
a constant intentionality of development" (338). Indeed, reason induces man to 
seize "in consciousness ... the idea of autonomy, the idea of a resolve of the will to 
shape one's whole personal life into the synthetic unity of a life of universal self-
responsibility." For man, to possess reason, amounts to having a telos, a goal 
toward which to develop, and thus to be able, in such development, "to be true to 
himself ... to remain identical with himself." Needless to say, to have reason in no 
way means to be reasonable. lt only means to have an innate goal, and with it a 
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task to accomplish, one which, as Husserl emphasizes, is inextricably linked to the 
will of the community of humans as a whole to shape its life according to 
principles of reason as well. 
Philosophy as a rational and universal science is the highest means towards 
attaining the goal inherent in man of becoming an autonomous and self-responsible 
being. Philosophy as rigorous science not only articulates this goal, but does so in 
a manner congruent with the goal itself, in other words, in an apodictically 
grounding way, one which thus can be understood or reconstructed by anyone. 
Husserl writes: "The universally, apodictically grounded and grounding science 
arises now as the necessarily highest function of mankind ... namely, as making 
possible mankind's development into a personal autonomy and into an all-
encompassing autonomy for mankind - the idea which represents the driving force 
of life for the highest stage of mankind" (338). Philosophy consequently has an 
imminently practical or ethical purpose. But that is not all! Qua rational science it 
is an intrinsically historical science in the sense that at no stage of its 
development, its apodictically grounded articulation of reason as the telos of 
humanity is completed. "Philosophy is nothing other than [rationalism], through and 
through, but it is rationalism differentiated within itself according to the different 
stages of the movement of intention and fulfillment; it is ratio in the constant 
movement of self-elucidation [Selbsterhellung], begun with the first breakthrough of 
philosophy into mankind, whose innate reason was previously in a state of 
concealment, of nocturnal obscurity" (339). Rather than the definite and polished 
presentation of what is universal, the idea of a universal science that irrupts for 
the first time in Greece, and that constitutes the idea of "Europe," is a rational 
science in that in setting reason as a goal, this very goal impels it to critically 
overcome each one of its historical elaborations by seeking greater and greater 
clarity about itself. Philosophy as rational and universal science is intrinsically 
historical not merely because it develops differentially in response to the various 
stages in which its goal is intended and finds fulfillment, but precisely because it is 
driven by the rational task of achieving increasing self-elucidation. This defining 
quality of critical self-elucidation - one that sets it apart from religion and 
mythical constructs - is what makes philosophy rational, and causes it to be in 
constant movement since its dawn in Greece. Although from the outside, 
philosophy may appear as just one cultural - or, 1 add, ethnic - formation among 
others, and its history merely "a causal process occurring in the world, in the 
world's space and time," "seen from the inside" it is "the constant struggle of 
'awakened' reason to come to itself, to an understanding of itself, to a reason 
which concretely understands itself in understanding the existing world, existing in 
its whole universal truth" (339). According to Husserl's poignant expression, 
"rationality" means to be "on the way to a higher rationality." lt is not a title one 
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- Europe, for instance - can claim to effectively possess, for rationality is 
equivalent to the awareness "again and again [of] its unsatisfying relativity .„ [and] 
is driven on in its toils, in its will to attain the true and full rationality." lt is 
neither a title that Greece can simply be credited with since the struggle of 
reason to come to itself has led to the discovery that reason, or rationality, is "an 
idea residing in the infinite." As Husserl observes, with this discovery that reason 
is an Idea in the Kantian sense, a "final form [Endgestalt] is discovered which itself 
becomes "the beginning form [Anfangsgestalt] of a new sort of infinity and 
relativity" (339). Distinct from the infinity (and relativity) of the objective, or spatio-
temporal, universal world, this new form of infinity characterizes the infinite tasks 
of critically and intersubjectively working toward a rational mankind. 
The demand of apodicticity, together with universality and absolute self-
responsibility - the founding ideas of "Europe" - is the first of these new infinite 
tasks. Although this discovery is, as we have seen before, made for the first time 
by Descartes, thereby opening up the period of modernity, and thus precedes 
Husserl's own attempt to radically renew its genuine sense, Descartes' discovery is 
a discovery of "what, in the transcendental understanding, outlines the primal 
ground and the primal method of all philosophy" (340), namely the demand of 
absolute self-responsibility and universal reconstructibility. By foregrounding the 
idea of apodicticity, not only a new beginning is made - one of newly infinite 
tasks - but also a new beginning in philosophizing and of what philosophy means. 
For, indeed, by making apodicticity into the fundamental problem of philosophy, to 
philosophize is to implicate not only all other philosophers, it is to implicate 
mankind as a whole. Rediscovering apodicticity, that is, the demand to think 
responsibly and in respect of others, that is, in conformity with the goal of making 
any claim one makes universally reconstructable, is to acknowledge that as a 
bearer of reason one is intersubjectively tied up with all others. lf apodicticity is 
the ultimate meaning of philosophy, then philosophy is necessarily about 
intersubjectivity, and the infinite process and progress of self-elucidation without 
which there can be no such thing. As Husserl remarks, with the rediscovery 
within phenomenology of apodicticity as the ultimate meaning and task of 
philosophy, "there begins a philosophy with the deepest and most universal self-
understanding of the philosophizing ego as the bearer of absolute reason coming to 
itself, of the same ego as implicating, in his apodictic being-for-himself, his fellow 
subjects and all possible fellow philosophers; [this is] the discovery of absolute 
intersubjectivity (objectified in the world as the whole of mankind), as that in 
which reason, in obscurity, in elucidation, in the movement of lucid self-
understanding, is in infinite progress" (340). 
The new sense of philosophy accruing from apodicticity as its fundamental 
problem, entails a new sense as well of what it means to be human. The new 
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meaning given to human existence in the wake of the philosophical discovery, or 
rediscovery, of apodicticity, is that of "the ultimate self-understanding of man as 
being responsible for his own human being: his self-understanding as heing in heing 
called to a life of apodicticity, not only in abstractly practicing apodictic science in 
the usual sense but [as being mankind] which realizes its whole concrete being in 
apodictic freedom by becoming apodictic mankind in the whole active life of its 
reason - through which it is human" (340). This is the infinite task of a humanity 
striving to live a life according to the idea of reason, a task that Husserl has 
identified as the essential meaning of "Europe" as an idea. The realization of this 
idea is not only an infinite task, it is also a realization that, rather than fulfilling a 
pregiven and programmatic notion of what rationality means, consists in the will to 
be rational, and hence also in the call to intersubjectively establish what is 
universal, and this in a process that itself is infinite. Husserl remarks: "mankind 
understanding itself as rational, understanding that it is rational in seeking to be 
rational .„ this signifies an infinity of living and striving toward reason; „. reason is 
precisely that which man qua man, in his innermost being, is aiming for" (340-41). 
In what is clearly a critical reference to Kant, Husserl concludes that such 
understanding of reason as the will to be rational, and thus to be true to oneself 
insofar as the human is capable of the odd demands that come with having reason, 
"allows for no differentiation into 'theoretical,' 'practical,' 'aesthetics,' or whatever." 
Being human, that is, living according to the goal set by the idea of something 
universal - an idea that violently irrupts in Greece, and has shaped what "Europe" 
as an idea means - "is teleological being and an ought-to-be, and ... this teleology 
holds sway in each and every activity and project of an ego." lt is meant to hold 
sway, as Husserl concludes, because the human being "through self-understanding „. 
can know the apodictic telos; and ... this knowing, the ultimate self-understanding, 
has no other form than self-understanding according to a priori principles as self-
understanding in the form of philosophy" (341). 
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